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1 Introduction
In their Journal of Finance article, Huberman and Regev (2001) describe vividly the
EntreMed saga: a Sunday New York Times article on a potential development of new cancer-
curing drugs caused the stock price of EntreMed to rise from 12.063 at the Friday close, to
open at 85 and close near 52 on Monday; intriguingly, the breakthrough had been reported
in the journal Nature and various newspapers including the Times (not on the front page
though) five months earlier and no new information was presented in that Sunday Times
article. Several puzzling questions immediately arise from the EntreMed drama — can
investors rationally react to innovation news which has highly unpredictable economic value?
If not, can they at least better price the innovations made by the firms with strong presence
of technology knowhow?1
This paper aims at addressing those questions by investigating investors’ reactions to
innovation news announcements in the biotechnology industry. Biotechnology is the set of
techniques that use living organisms to make biologic products(e.g., drugs, modified foods),
to assist in the development of non-biological products (e.g., specialty chemicals), or to
research the basis of disease. The biotechnology industry is one of few industries that has
purely emerged from several key innovative ideas and scientific breakthroughs — the double
helix structure of DNA identified by Watson and Crick in the 1950s; restriction enzymes
used to splice human DNA into microbes developed in the 1970s; and recombinant insulin
approved for human use in the 1980s, etc. It is an ideal testing ground for us to understand
how investors respond to innovative events with highly uncertain commercial potentials.
Searching the Lexis/Nexis database, we collect a sample of 611 innovation events
announced by 103 biotech companies between January 1983 and December 1993.2 Applying
1Note that prior literature (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis 1996; Amir and Lev 1996; and Aboody and Lev
1998) has documented the value relevance of the intangibles in high-tech industries and argued that they
contain information not captured by reported earnings and book values.
2The 1980s witnessed the majority of essential innovations in biotechnology. It was also a period during
which the majority of biotech firms went public and scaled up their operations. Beginning in the mid 1990s,
almost all major pharmaceutical players started to adopt enabling technologies which greatly blurred the
line between biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms. To have a clean environment to conduct our analysis,
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the conventional event study method, we find that the average abnormal return to the
announcements runs as high as 3.98% for a three-day event window. Austin (1993), and
Chan et al. (1997) report similar findings in related settings.
But how well does the market interpret the news? Do the significantly positive abnormal
returns imply that the good news really is that good? We then study the medium-term stock
performance subsequent to innovative events.3 Following Barber and Lyon (1997), we use
an appropriately selected single matched firm for each sample firm. We then calculate the
stock returns of each sample firm net of the returns of its control firm. The exercise yields
a striking result — in several months after the innovative events, negative drift in stock
prices is observed and the average 3-month post-announcement abnormal return is -2.73%.
As a robustness check, we also use other benchmarks to measure the post-announcement
medium-horizon stock performance. For example, we measure the medium-horizon stock
performance adjusting for size and book-to-market effects; we also calculate the returns net
of the returns of the industry portfolio comprised by firms with the same 4-digit SIC code;
and lastly we employ the Fama-French 3-factor model to calculate the abnormal returns. All
experiments yield the same result — the average post-announcement abnormal returns are
significantly negative.
Our findings favor the investors’ expectational error hypothesis.4 Namely, the investors
are too easily seduced by prospects delivered by technological innovation news and tend to
mis-price innovative events. Obviously, if this hypothesis is true, we expect that the degree
of mispricing should not be universally symmetric — the mispricing should be more severe
for the past winners (measured by low book-to-market ratio), and firms with a weak science
and technology base (measured by the R&D intensity). As event time passes and more
information is revealed, investors start to gradually adjust the stock price to its appropriate
we focus on the 1983-1993 period.
3A typical biotech firm makes innovation announcements on a frequent basis, the more common long-
horizon (3 years or 5 years) stock performance approach is not necessarily applicable here.
4The same hypothesis has been used by La Porta et al. (1997) to explain the difference in value and
glamour stocks in earnings announcement returns.
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level. The firms that were mispriced most in the beginning will adjust the most. Thus, we
would observe that the stocks with a lower B/M ratio (glamour stocks), and the stocks of
firms that are not R&D intensive have larger medium-horizon negative drift. The analysis of
the cross-sectional abnormal returns confirms the hypothesis. Note that the stocks of R&D
intensive firms performing better than other firms provides strong support for the R&D value
relevance argument (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis (1996)).
The paper relates to two streams of literature. The first one focuses on the valuation of
R&D ventures or firm-specific intangibles. Griliches (1981) is one of the first papers that
studies the relationship between a firm’s market value and its R&D expenditures and patents,
where Tobin’s Q is used as the measure of the firm value and regressed against R&D and
patent counts.5 Darby, Liu, and Zucker (2004) propose a jump-diffusion process to capture
the evolving of high-tech firms’ valued assets. They identify the jumps in biotech firms’
market value, which are caused by technological innovations. Event study approach has also
been used to measure the value of technological innovations in prior literature (e.g., Austin
1993, and Chan et al. 1997). Event study, however, assumes that information contained
in innovation news is revealed and incorporated into stock prices immediately. Our findings
seriously challenge this assumption.
This paper also contributes to a large and growing literature that addresses the stock
market reactions to different corporate events. A common finding in this literature is that
the market does not respond completely to corporate events. Stock prices either overreact or
under react to the firm’s news announcements.6 In terms of the signs of announcement period
abnormal returns, pre-and post-event abnormal returns, Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) is the
closest one to our study. Both papers identify positive pre-event and announcement-period
abnormal returns, and negative post-event abnormal returns. Dharan and Ikenberry argue
5Also see Megna and Klock 1993, Trajtenberg 1990, and Hall 1993.
6For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) identify long-run negative abnormal returns subsequent to
IPOs and SEOs; Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) find negative drift in stock prices after the firm is listed in
a new exchange. Womack (1996) documents post-event positive abnormal returns subsequent to brokerage
analysts’ buy recommendations.
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that firms list their stocks to take advantage of the market’s overreaction to their recent
good times. This paper however shows evidence supporting the investors’ expectational
error hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the data used
in this study. The stock market reactions to innovation-news announcements are studied in
Section 3. We carry out the cross-sectional analysis of the short-and medium-horizon stock
performance and link the degree of mispricing to several firm-specific variables in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Data
To perform our search for the biotech firms’ innovation-news announcements, we look for
five categories of news announcements:
• FDA approval, which includes two possibilities: (i) a drug is approved for production
or marketing; and (ii) a drug is approved to enter into clinical trials or the next round
of trials.
• A patent is granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office.
• Scientific breakthroughs made by the firm’s affiliated scientists. They are usually
announced by the firm’s scientists in professional conferences or published in top
journals. Sometimes the firm even holds a press conference to announce its important
discovery.
• Strategic alliances or research joint ventures formed by biotech firms.
• Others, e.g., news on technology transfer, news regarding research grants.
We find that the five categories of news announcements cover almost all of the biotech
firms’ technology-related news events. To obtain our sample, we start with 156 biotechnology
4
companies that went public before 1993.7 We exclude the firms that do not have records in
COMPUSTAT or CRSP. This reduces the number of biotech firms to 129. We then search
the Lexis/Nexis database (including the Business Wire, PR Newswire, Southwest Newswire,
Reuters and United Press International ) for the entire 1983-1993 period. We focus on 1983-
1993 for the following reasons: (i) since the mid-1990s, most major pharmaceutical firms
started to adopt enabling technologies, which blurred the line between pharmaceutical firms
and biotech firms; (ii) teaming up with major pharmaceutical players has emerged as a
popular business model for most biotech firms after 1994. As our purpose is to study how
investors react to innovative ideas with highly uncertain commercial potential, we need a
relatively clean environment.
To perform the search, we retrieve all the news released by the biotech firms. In order to
isolate the effects of different events, we drop the innovation news that clusters with other
news within a 10-month time period (5 months prior to and after). We then exclude the
non-technology-related news items. We are able to identify 677 non-clustered technology
events announced by 118 biotech firms. We drop the announcements made in the fourth
quarter of 1987 to control the effects of the market crash on our empirical results. We also
drop the announcements that lack complete data in the CRSP daily, or monthly return files.
Finally, we are left with 611 announcements by 103 firms.
Panel A of Table 1 presents six sample announcements for the five categories defined
above (there are two sample announcements for type 5). Panel B presents the number
and percentage for each category in the whole sample. As shown in Table 1, the largest
category in our sample is FDA approval, which accounts for 25.7% of total announcements.
The second largest group turns out to be scientific breakthrough, which accounts for almost
24.1%. Patent grant is ranked as the third with 20.1%, and strategic alliance the fourth with
18.3%. We identified 72 type-5 announcements, which comprise about 11.8% of the sample.
7Special thanks to Michael Darby and Lynne Zucker for providing us with the list of biotech firms in the
U.S. For the detail about the list, see Zucker et al. 1994.
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In order to measure the stock market’s reaction, we use daily stock returns and monthly
stock returns in our analysis, which are extracted from CRSP. Biotech firms’ accounting
information is from COMPUSTAT. The firms’ IPO information is obtained from the
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) files and financial analyst information is from the
I/B/E/S database. Finally, in our analysis, we also use the reputation rank for the lead
underwriters that brought the biotech firms public and this is obtained from Carter, Dark
and Singh (1998).
3 Stock Market Reactions to Innovative News Events
3.1 The announcement period stock performance
Following the standard practice, we use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to estimate
the effect of an innovation news announcement on stock returns. The factor loadings are
estimated by using daily returns from trading day -120 to day -20 and from trading day 20
to day 130 relative to the announcement day. We designate day 0 the date that the firm
makes the announcement. The coefficients are then used to calculate predicted returns. The
difference between the actual and predicted returns is abnormal returns (ARs).
Table 2 summarizes the short-run stock price reaction towards innovation news
announcements. We identify the abnormal returns up to 10 days prior to the event and
10 days after the event. We also calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for the 2-day
event window (from day 0 to day 1), 3-day event window (from day -1 to day +1) and 5-day
event window (from day -2 to day +2). Significance tests are based on a standardized test
statistic constructed to determine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly different
from zero. Panel A of Table 2 documents the abnormal returns from day -10 to day +10.
The day 0 average abnormal return is a statistically significant 2.977% (t−statistic = 7.99).
Surprisingly, we find the average abnormal returns become negative after day 1 and are
statistically significant on some of the days from day 2 to day 10. This imposes a serious
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challenge to the “information content” hypothesis since people may argue that the positive
abnormal returns are caused by the buying pressure during the announcement period. After
this pressure is gone, the stock price will revert to its initial level. 8 In order to test whether
this argument is sensible, we calculate the CARs from day +2 to day 11 (a rather long period
for the buying pressures to evaporate). We find that the mean CARs for this period is just
-2.0%, which is significantly lower than the returns at the announcement. Obviously, the
innovation news contains information.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the CARs for three different event windows. Since our
announcement dates come from the wire services and are not from the Wall Street Journal
(WSJ),9 it is not surprising to find that most of the price adjustment in our sample occurs
on the 5 days surrounding the announcements (from day -2 to day 2). As reported in Panel
B of Table II, the average 3-day CARs is 3.978% and the average 2-day CARs is 3.573%.
Both are statistically significant (t-statistics are 7.97 and 7.57, respectively). The average
5-day CARs is 3.451% (t-statistic = 6.44). If we assume that the market incorporates the
new information into the price efficiently and immediately, the above finding represents a
very large amount of wealth increased due to the biotech firms’ innovation activities.
In Panel C of Table 2, we analyze the average CARs for different innovative categories.
Not surprisingly, all of them are significantly positive. Among five different categories,
scientific breakthrough and FDA approval have the highest average CARs (the average 2-
day CARs are 5.54% and 4.79%, respectively). The mean CARs of patent grant is 2.72%,
which is also higher than the level documented by Austin (1993).10 Both 2-day and 3-day
CARs for patent grant are smaller than those of scientific breakthrough and FDA approval.
8For example, Barber and Loeffler (1993) conclude that the positive abnormal returns on
recommendations by theWall Street Journal “Dartboard Column” partly result from naive buying pressures.
9The Wall Street Journal normally has one day or two days’ delay in its announcements of given events.
Relying on the dates from the WSJ may misspecify the correct time of information disclosure. In that case,
a longer window is appropriate, even though it may contain much noise.
10Our explanation is that Austin used patent grant dates from the US Patent Office as the event dates.
In contrast, we obtain the event dates by searching the wire services, therefore, our events dates are more
appropriate. Also, if a firm makes an announcement about a certain patent, this patent, everything else
equal, should be relatively more valuable.
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Given the fact that about 70% of patent applications are eventually granted by the US
Patent Office, we know that just before the patent is granted, the stock price should have
included the expected value of the patent. The grant of the patent increases the probability
that the patent will be granted from a number around 0.7 to 1.0, so the value of the patent
is only about a third of the value of the underlying discovery, with two thirds already in
stock prices. Strategic alliance announcements cause a relatively small stir in the market.
This can be explained by the fact that they are normally related to the earliest stages of a
firm’s R&D process.11
3.2 The medium-horizon post-event stock performance
Given the costly information required to correctly estimate the value of an innovative event,
one may suspect that investors may fail to correctly price an innovation news item. Studying
the medium-horizon post-event stock performance thus is necessary.
There has been much controversy on medium-horizon and long-term return anomaly
studies. Fama (1998) argues that most long-term return anomalies are actually due
to the methodologies used. Once the appropriate methodologies are employed, most of
the anomalies will disappear. In the same article, he also points out that cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) pose fewer statistical problems. Barber and Lyon (1997) provide
a comprehensive discussion of inference problems in the tests of long-term anomalies. They
argue that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) do a better job than the CARs.
Lyon et al. (1999) develop elaborate techniques to correct some of the inference problems of
BHARs.12 Given this controversy, we use both a CAR and BHAR approach in this paper
and find they generate similar results.
11We only include in our sample the strategic alliances or joint ventures that are related to R&D. We
exclude the announcements on marketing arrangements or product distribution arrangements.
12Brav (1999) has recently pointed out that all existing methods for drawing inferences from BHARs,
including those in Lyon et al. (1999) fail to correct fully for the correlation of returns across events not
absorbed by the model used to adjust for expected returns. However, given the fact that the time period
considered in our study is much shorter than other long-term return anomaly studies, this correlation concern
is not severe.
8
To measure the medium-horizon abnormal stock performance following innovation-news
announcements, we first use the control firm approach. Barber and Lyon (1997) show
that this approach compares favorably to other approaches in drawing statistically reliable
inferences. In the analysis, we use size-and-industry matched control firms.13 We first select
the CRSP-listed firms in the Fama-French drug industry (with SIC code 2830-2836). At
every year-end, we rank these firms by market value of equity within each exchange group.
For each observation in the sample, we choose the firm with the market value closest to the
sample firm within the same exchange as the control firm. If at a certain time point, there
were fewer than five firms within the exchange/industry group, we then pair the sample firm
with whichever firm has the same two-digit industry code and the closest market value. This
arrangement enables us to pair all of our sample firms with one control firm. We calculate
CARs and BHARs using monthly returns. The t-statistics are calculated by using the cross-
section of excess returns, computed by the difference between sample and matching firm
returns.
In addition to the control firm approach, we also employ three other methods to calculate
the medium-horizon abnormal returns, namely, the industry benchmark method,14 the size
and B/M ratio benchmark method,15 and the Fama-French three-factor approach.16
13We also use size and book-to-market matched control firm approach and and find it does not change the
results qualitatively. We choose to report the former.
14We calculate the returns net of the industry benchmark. The industry benchmark portfolios are defined
based on 4-digit SIC codes. The firm in our sample is matched to a 4-digit industry portfolio according to
the firm’s reported 4-digit SIC code.
15We calculate the returns net of the returns of the size and B/M ratio matched portfolio. We form the
25 (5X5) size and B/M ratio portfolios by following the same procedures in Fama and French 1992, 1993.
16For each firm, the returns are modelled to be:
Rj,t = Rf,t + γ0 + γ1(Rm,t −Rf,t) + γ2SMBt + γ3HMLt + t,
where t is an event month index, Rj,t is the raw return for firm j, Rf,t is the risk-free rate (monthly return on
3-month treasury bills), Rm,t is the value-weighted CRSP index, SMBt in the above equation is the return
difference between a portfolio of small and a portfolio of large firms, and HMLt is the return difference
between a portfolio of high B/M firms and a portfolio of low B/M firms. The factor loadings in this equation
are estimated by using the monthly returns from month -5 to month -1, and from month 1 to month 12
(month 0 represents the event month) (also see Womack 1996). After we obtain the factor loadings, we are
able to calculate the expected returns for one stock based on the equation. The Fama-French three-factor
adjusted abnormal returns are thus defined as the difference between the raw returns and the theoretical
returns derived from the above equation.
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Table 3 documents the medium-horizon mean abnormal returns. Since the required
variables in computing medium-horizon abnormal returns are not available for every firm-
event observation, our sample size shrinks to 580. Let us first look at the abnormal
returns adjusted by the size-and-industry matched control firm. The average 2-month
pre-announcement BHARs (from month -2 to month -1) are statistically and economically
significant ( BHAR−2=3.74%, t-statistic = 2.45). It implies that there may exist certain
“leakage” before the news is finally announced. This finding suggests that only considering
the abnormal returns around the announcement day might be misleading.
Our interest, however, is in post-announcement stock performance. As shown in Table 3,
the firm suffers negative post-announcement drift in its stock prices. The negative drift can
be observed for various time windows. To check whether this post-announcement negative
drift is due to the procedures or the benchmarks employed, we compute the medium-horizon
abnormal returns in both CAR and BHAR terms and use the four different methods discussed
above. We find that the identified negative drift is robust. For example, using the size-and-
industry matched control firm as the benchmark to compute abnormal stock returns, we
find that the mean three-and four-month post-announcement BHARs are -2.73% and -3.40%
respectively. If we consider CARs, the average three-and four-month CARs subsequent to the
announcement are -4.38% (t-statistic = -2.75) and -3.75% (t-statistic=-2.03). The magnitude
and significance are very similar to the BHARs.
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that long-term BHARs are positively skewed and inferences
drawn from them may be biased. In our study, the time horizons (several months) considered
are much shorter than those in other studies on the long-run stock performance. The bad
inference problem due to skewness may not be severe. Also, Barber and Lyon demonstrate
that the matched control firm approach (as we use in the paper) can better control the
inference problem due to skewness. Therefore, we only report the conventional t-statistics
in Table 3.17
17Lyon et al. (1999) propose a bootstrapped application of the following equation which provides well-
specified test statistics: tsa =
√
n(S + 13 γˆS
2 + 16n γˆ), where γˆ is an estimate of the coefficient of skewness
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Also, note that the cross-sectional correlation problem is not very severe given that we
have excluded the clustered news announcements and the time horizons are much shorter in
our study. This avoids overlapping periods of return calculation for the same firm.18 Given
the fact that our results are robust to all these experiments, we believe the identified negative
drift is not spurious. We also check whether this drift is due to outliers. It turns out that
dropping outliers does not change the results qualitatively.
One may question whether the magnitude of post-event abnormal returns is different
across the five news categories since there is often some specific sequence associated with
the occurrence of these events — e.g., scientific breakthrough comes earlier than field trials,
which are then followed by FDA approval. Therefore, pooling them may yield spurious
results. We compute the medium-horizon abnormal returns for each news category and then
use the Kruskal-Wallis statistics to test whether the 5 different event categories are taken
from the same population. The results show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
at any reasonable significance levels.19 Obviously, even though there is a specific sequence
associated with different types of events, it has not been reflected in the market reaction.
4 Why is good news not that good?
4.1 Discussion of Possible Explanations
4.1.1. IPO or SEO Underperformance
One of the explanations for the negative medium-horizon abnormal returns is that they
are due to the well-documented post-IPO or post-SEO return behavior. Given the fact that
and
√
nS is the conventional t statistic. We undertake the experiment and find the results do not change
significantly.
18We do not correct the interdependence of stock returns among event firms for the following reasons:
(1) we use industry portfolios to calculate the abnormal returns, which already capture part of the cross-
correlation among event firms; (2) we only consider 3-6 months subsequent to news announcements. During
a relatively shorter period (compared to the years), the probability of having multiple events is comparatively
low, therefore, the correlation problem is less severe; (3) Fama (1998) points out that using CARs reduces
the biases due to cross-sectional correlation.
19Not reported in the paper, but available upon request from the author.
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the biotech industry is a new industry and many biotech firms went public just recently, it
is very likely that the observed negative drifts are caused by biotech firms’ recent IPOs or
SEOs.
In order to test the hypothesis, we decompose our sample into two groups: one that
consists of firms that had an IPO or SEO within three years of the studied events; the other
that consists of firms that had not had any IPO or SEO in these 3 years. We compute
the medium-horizon post-announcement abnormal returns for both groups. The results
are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Clearly, if we exclude the events for the firms that
had had IPO or SEO within 3 years of the studied events (there are 128 such events),
the medium-horizon BHARs of the remaining events are still significantly negative. For
example, the 3-month BHARs for Non-IPO and Non-SEO firms are -8.43% (t-statistic =
-4.22). Interestingly, compared to Non-IPO and Non-SEO firms, IPO or SEO firms’ post-
event abnormal returns are, on average, smaller in their magnitude. This is in striking
contrast with the IPO/SEO underperformance hypothesis. One of the possible explanations
is that investors are more cautious about the innovation news issued by firms that had had
IPO or SEO recently. If it is indeed the case, then it would be consistent with the investor
expectational error hypothesis, which we will detail later.
4.1.2. Mean-reversal in Stock Returns
An alternative explanation for the observed post-event negative drift is that it is due
to the mean-reversal of stock returns. According to this argument, although investors may
have overreacted to the initial news, they adjust down the stock prices later. Several past
studies have reported on such price reversals following large initial reactions (e.g., Barber
and Loeffler 1993).
If the negative post-announcement abnormal returns are indeed caused by the price
reversals, we would observe that the firm-event with large initial reactions has large post-
event negative drift. Panel B of Table 4 provides the correlation table for the announcement
period abnormal returns (ER0, ER3), pre-event BHARs (BHAR−1, BHAR−3), and post-
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event BHARs (BHAR1, BHAR3, BHAR4). Clearly, the post-event abnormal returns are
not significantly correlated to announcement period abnormal returns, and are unrelated to
the pre-event abnormal returns.
4.1.3. Survivor Bias
Another confounding cause of medium-horizon negative returns is the survivor bias. In
our sample selection process, we exclude the firm-event that lacks complete data in CRSP
or COMPUSTAT databases. It is likely that successful biotech firms are bought out and
therefore withdraw from the sample, leaving the less successful ones in the sample. To provide
a robustness check, we re-examine our sample selection process. Among the 66 observations
dropped from the sample due to a lack of data, 37 are dropped simply because they occurred
in the fourth quarter of 1987. We intentionally exclude them to control the effects of market
crash on the stock returns. 29 firm-events are dropped because they contained missing
values, among which only 7 firm-event observations are eliminated due to M&A activities.
Even if we assume that the acquired or merged firms are more successful than other firms
(our conversations with the biotech experts show that it is not the case), their impact on
the sample is very limited.
4.1.4. Window of Opportunity Hypothesis
Many studies attribute the abnormal long-run stock performance to the firm managers’
timing ability. For example, Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) study negative post-listing
abnormal returns and find that firm managers decide to change the exchange listing when
their stocks are overvalued. Ritter (1991) also applies the same reasoning to explain the
long-run IPO underperformance. If biotech firms’ managers are timing their innovative
news announcements, then we should expect a post-announcement negative drift in stock
returns. Although this hypothesis seems promising, it has several problems. As we will show
in Section 4.2, large firms or firms with low B/M ratio tend to have a large negative drift.
This clearly runs against the window of opportunity hypothesis since small firms or firms with
bad past market performance should have stronger incentive to time their announcements.
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4.1.5. Investors’ Expectational Error Hypothesis
The negative post-event drift may also result from investors’ expectational error. Given
the fact that most innovations in high-tech industries are technologically complicated,
investors may have trouble fully understanding these announcements. Innovation news per
se is treated favorably. As event time proceeds, investors steadily liberate themselves from
their initial enthusiasm. This learning process leads to a gradual adjustment over a relatively
longer horizon in the stock returns. Obviously, this is a real question for future research as to
how this over-optimism could form in the first place and appear repeatedly and predictably.
If this hypothesis is true, we should observe that the mispricing problem would not
be universally symmetric across firms. For the firms that have a very strong past stock
performance, and the firms that do not have much technology depth, the mispricing problem
is more likely to be severe. Consequently, the medium-horizon post-announcement negative
price drift should be larger. On the contrary, for the firms that have invested intensively in
R&D, and the firms that have been out of favor, mispricing becomes less likely. We are able
to test the mispricing hypothesis by studying whether the above predictions hold empirically.
4.2 Testing the Investors’ Expectational Error Hypothesis
In order to test the investors’ expectational error hypothesis, we first introduce several firm-
specific variables. First, it is important to capture the presence of a biotech firm’s technology
knowhow — its technology depth. We use R&D intensity to do so. We first calculate
the stock of R&D capital, RDCj,t for firm j in year t based on current and past R&D
expenditures:
RDCj,t = R&Dj,t + 0.8RDCj,t−1. (1)
In equation (1), we assume that the productivity of each dollar of R&D spending declines
linearly by twenty percent a year. This assumption is consistent with other studies on R&D.20
Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (1999) apply the ratios of R&D relative to sale and market
20For example, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (1999).
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equity value to measure a firm’s R&D intensity. The ratio of R&D capital (RDC) relative
to sales is not an appropriate measure of R&D intensity in our study given the fact that
many biotech firms do not have products in the marketplace. We measure a firm’s R&D
intensity using the ratios of R&D stock relative to total assets (book value), and market
equity value. We name them R&D/asset and R&D/equity, respectively. Also, considering
that in year t, only the accounting information in year t-1 is available, we use R&D/Assett−1
and R&D/equityt−1 to capture the firm’s technology depth in year t.
Like most studies on long-term stock performance, we are interested in the roles played
by size and B/M ratio. The size variable is defined as the natural log of market equity value.
Also, we define a new variable, SIZERANK to capture the size quintile in the CRSP universe
that the firm is in. For example, if the firm is in the top size quintile then SIZERANK = 5;
if it is in the bottom quintile, then SIZERANK=1.
We defined two book-to-market variables in our study: the natural log of B/M ratio
(LBM), and the rank of B/M (BMRANK) in the CRSP universe. The latter measures the
book-to-market ratio quintile in which the firm is placed in the CRSP universe. That is, if
the firm belongs to the top quintile, then the BMRANK is 5; and if it belongs to the bottom
quintile, then the BMRANK is 1.
As argued by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), underwriters may play a role in reducing
asymmetric information surrounding news announcements. The information asymmetry
problem is less severe for the firms that were made public by underwriters with a good
reputation. For each firm in our sample, we obtain the name of its lead underwriter from the
SDC database. We denote the quality of the underwriters by using their relative reputational
standing during 1985-1991. Lastly, we also use the age of the firm, and the time since IPO,
and some other firm-specific variables to control the cross-sectional difference.
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4.2.1 Cross-sectional analysis of announcement period abnormal returns
We conduct the cross-sectional analysis of the announcement period returns and the medium-
horizon abnormal returns and report the results in Table 5. The left half of Table 5 (models
1-4) reports the results of using either one-day abnormal returns, ER0, or three-day CARs,
ER3, as the dependant variables. Note that both ER0 and ER3 are negatively correlated
with the size variables — LME and SIZERANK. They are also negatively related to the
underwriter reputation. We also observe a negative relationship between them and the B/M
ratio, the relationship is not significant though. The most striking fact, however, is that
both ER0 and ER3 are positively related to the firm’s R&D intensity, measured by either
R&D/assett−1 or R&D/equityt−1.
The evidence is not consistent with the buying pressure hypothesis since we observe
that the short-run abnormal returns are related to variables that capture the degree of
information asymmetry (e.g., size and underwriter reputation). The negative relation
between ER0, ER3 and B/M ratio implies that the investors view more favorably the news
about firms that have had a good past stock performance and they are relatively concerned
with the innovative events issued by firms with value stocks. The evidence suggests that
the investors’ estimation about the innovation could be biased. The economically and
statistically significant correlation between the firm’s R&D intensity and the investors’ initial
response to the innovation highlights the importance of R&D (or more generally, intangibles)
in assessing the economic value of a certain innovation.
To sum up, the announcement period abnormal returns depend on how investors assesss
the information contained in a certain item of innovation news. Their inferences strongly
depend on the firm’s technology depth, past stock performance, and size.
4.2.2 Cross-sectional analysis of medium-horizon abnormal returns
Since the market reactions may reflect investors’ over-optimism about innovation news
announcements, the investors will adjust their expectation about the value of the innovations
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once they realize that they may have been wrong in the first place or subsequent developments
fail to meet their initial anticipations. If this investors’ expectational error hypothesis is true,
we expect the post-event negative drift to be related to several firm-specific variables that
proxy for the degree of over-optimism at the announcements. We run the multivariate
regressions using the medium-horizon abnormal returns as the dependent variables and
report the results in the right half of Table 5 (models 5-8).21
The results from Table 5 are striking: after we control for the age of the firm or the
time since IPO and the reputation rank of the firm’s underwriter, we still find significant
correlation between medium-horizon post-event abnormal returns and R&D intensity, and
B/M ratio. The results strongly suggest that the R&D intensity and B/M ratio could
explain the medium-horizon negative abnormal returns. The size variables — LME and
SIZERANK — enter the regressions positively although the relationship is not significant in
most model specifications. The underwriter’s reputation — MANAGER— is not significant,
which implies that underwriter’s reputation is not an important information variable in the
medium and long run. In the medium and long run, the investors probably are able to
use more reliable variables to retrieve the information contained in certain news. Also note
that when we control for the firm age and the time since IPO, the results do not change.
This implies that the observed anomaly is not due to the well-documented IPO under-
performance. 22 Below we discuss the key variables one by one to demonstrate how they
support the investors’ expectional error hypothesis:
Technology Depth
The positive sign of R&D intensity variables — R&D/equityt−1 and R&D/assett−1 —
implies that innovations made by the firms that have invested less intensively in R&D are
more likely to be overvalued in the beginning; as a result of this, the post-announcement
21Note we only report the results of using BHARs, which are calculated by netting the raw returns out
of the returns of size-and-industry matched firms. Using other abnormal returns measures yields the same
results.
22As one may suggest, the negative drift may be caused by bad news that immediately follows the initial
good news. This seems unlikely in our study given the fact we drop the news clustering with other news.
Also, in our search for technological news announcements, we do not see such a pattern.
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negative drift may be more severe for them. Obviously, the negative medium-horizon drift
is mainly driven by the firms that have not been active in R&D. This finding supports the
investors’ expectational error hypothesis. It is worth noting that the evidence on R&D also
supports the R&D value relevance argument (see Lev and Sougiannis 1996).
Glamour vs. Value
If investors misprice the value of innovations, the mispricing should be more severe for low
B/M stocks (glamour stocks) since those stocks normally draw more attention and investors
tend to extrapolate the past performance into the future. By the same logic, we expect stocks
with high B/M ratios (value stocks) to be less mispriced. The positive sign of the two book-
to-market ratio variables in models 5-8 — LBM and BMRANK — confirms the argument.
Obviously, as B/M ratio increases, the negative drift in stock returns becomes smaller. The
evidence suggests that investors are systematically more responsive to the innovative events
of glamour stocks. Medium-horizon negative performance subsequent to innovation news
announcements thus may be partly explained by investors’ initial over optimism towards
innovative events of glamour stocks.
Small firms vs. large firms
The negative sign of size variables implies that small firms outperform large firms in the
post-event period. The evidence is inconsistent with the window of opportunity hypothesis —
if the negative drift in stock prices subsequent to the innovation news is caused by managers’
timing ability, it should be more severe for small firms and firms with bad past performance
(value stocks) but not large and growth firms.
It is bewildering as to why larger firms have larger negative drift. One possibility is
that the market mistakenly assumes that large firms will have a higher future probability of
technological success whereas, in reality, they are no more likely to succeed in research than
smaller firms. If it is true, we would expect the investors to be more optimistic about larger
firms’ innovative events. However, the announcement period returns are actually smaller for
larger firms.
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Another explanation is as follows. Large firms usually attract more attention from
investors. If investors overestimate the value of innovation news, the mispricing may be
exaggerated since there are more tradings for such firms. Consequently, the medium-horizon
post-event negative drift is more substantial for them. This explanation clearly is in line
with the “investors’ expectational error hypothesis”.
4.2.3 Further Evidence from Analyst Forecast Data
The identified empirical evidence favors the investors’ expectational error hypothesis. If the
negative post-event abnormal returns are indeed caused by investors’ expectational error,
it will also be reflected in financial analysts’ earnings forecasting activities. We search the
I/B/E/S summary database for financial analysts following information. Among 580 firm-
event observations, there are 347 which have at least one annual earnings forecast on the
event month. 233 firm-event observations do not have any financial analyst following on the
event month.
For the 347 firm events with analysts following, we sort them by their ex post forecast
errors. Here, the ex post forecast errors are defined as the difference between the median
of annual earning forecast issued on the event month minus the actual annual earnings
realization deflated by the stock price at the end of the event month. We compare the post-
event return behavior for top the 30% observations (optimistic group) and the bottom 30%
observations (pessimistic group). For the optimistic group, the subsequent developments fail
to meet the analysts’ expectation. Therefore, if the investors’ expectational error hypothesis
is correct, we should expect this group has larger post-announcement negative drift. Evidence
from Table 6 confirms this argument. It seems that the post-announcement negative drift is
largely driven by the group of firms towards which the analysts have been overly optimistic.
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5 Conclusion
This paper examines the stock market reactions to U.S. biotech firms’ innovation news
announcements. We identify a medium-horizon negative drift in the stock price subsequent
to firms’ innovative events and propose an expectational error hypothesis to explain the
observed puzzle. Our basic argument is as follows. Since R&D ventures in high-tech
industries are multi-stage projects with many sources of risk, it is hard for investors or
even managers to precisely evaluate the economic value of innovations from different stages.
The investors’ valuation process is a learning by doing process with the possibility of forming
erroneous expectations. In the high-tech field, this expectational error could be reflected in
the investors’ over-optimism towards a high-tech firm’s innovation news. The expectational
error leads to investors’ mispricing of innovative events. However, the degree of mispricing
is not universally symmetric. The firms with a weak science and technology base, high B/M
ratio, or of large size are more likely to be mispriced.
The identified empirical evidence and corresponding explanation generate several
implications: (i) given the fact that investors tend to misprice the value of innovative
events, using an event study approach to value a certain innovation is questionable; and
(ii) a high-tech firm’s stock market performance is eventually determined by the firm’s
fundamentals, especially its technology depth. This suggests the possibility of using R&D
or other intangibles to explain cross-sectional difference in stock returns.
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Table 1: Biotech firms’ innovation news announcements: 1983-1993 
 Announcements were identified using a search of the Lexis/Nexis database (including the Business Wire, 
PR Newswire, Southwest Newswire, Reuters and United Press International) for the 1983-1993 period. We 
classify the announcements into 5 categories according to the nature of a given piece of news (1) FDA 
approval; (2) patent grant; (3) scientific breakthrough; (4) strategic alliance or joint venture; (5) 
announcements that cannot be classified into any of these 4 groups. Panel A of this table provides a sample 
announcement for the first 4 types of news and two sample announcements for the fifth category. Panel B 
presents the percent of each category in the sample.  
 
Panel A: Sample announcement by category 
Announcement Category 
 
                                                Sample Announcement 
I. FDA approval The Food and Drug administration Friday approved Genentech’s first human 
pharmaceutical, a biosynthetic growth hormone for treating severely  non-
growth children… (Business Wire, 10/18/85).  
 
II. Patent Grant Advanced Magnetics, Inc. (NASDAQ: ADMG) announced today that it has 
been granted U.S. Patent 5,055,288 which includes claims to 
superparamagnetic resonance contrast agents wit ha long blood half-life… (PR 
Newswire, 10/01/91)  
 
III. Scientific    
      Breakthrough 
Scientists at Genelabs Incorporated, in collaboration with the Hepatitis Branch 
of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), today reported in the journal Science 
that they have successfully cloned a portion of the Hepatitis E Virus… .This is 
a very exciting discovery, which creates the possibility of a tool diagnosing the 
illness… (PR Newswire, 03/16/90). 
 
IV. Strategic Alliance or 
      Joint Venture 
Agouron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. announced today that it has formed a major 
strategic alliance with Japan Tobacco Inc., of Tokyo, for the joint discovery, 
development and commercialization of novel therapeutic drugs which act on 
key proteins related to the human immune systems…(PR Newswire, 12/18/92). 
 
V. Others Advanced Genetic Sciences announced Wednesday the company successfully 
completed its second field-test of Frostban, the genetically altered bacteria 
designed to prevent frost damage to fruit and nut crops. Preliminary results 
confirmed that Frostban effectively protected strawberry plants from the 
natural bacteria that cause frost to form… (Business Wire, 04/27/88). 
 
Biogen, Inc. announced today the beginning of clinical trials for RECEPTIN, 
its brand of recombinant soluble CD4, an experimental AIDs therapeutic… 
(PR Newswire, 10/12/88). 
 
Panel B: Description of the sample by Category 
Category of Announcements Number of Announcements Percentage 
 
I. FDA Approval 157 25.7 
II. Patent Grant 123 20.1 
III. Scientific breakthrough 147 24.1 
IV. Strategic Alliance  112 18.3 
V. Others 72 11.8 
 
Total 
 
 
611 
 
100 
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Table 2: Abnormal returns(ARs), and cumulative abnormal returns(CARs) around news 
announcements 
The sample is 611 innovation news announcements made by 103 biotech companies between 1983 and 
1993. The abnormal returns (ARs) are derived from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) using the 
CRSP value-weighted market index as the market return.  Besides abnormal returns, we also calculate the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 2-day period, 3-day period and 5-day period, t-statistics are 
calculated from the cross section of abnormal returns or cumulative returns. 
          
 Panel A: Abnormal stock returns around the announcement day 
 
Day from 
Distribution 
AR t-statistic 
Day -10 0.179% 0.92 
Day -9 0.141% 0.77 
Day -8 -0.178% -0.98 
Day -7 0.277% 1.47 
Day -6 -0.087% -0.42 
Day -5 0.160% 0.81 
Day -4 0.136% 0.74 
Day -3 -0.074% -0.41 
Day -2 0.272% 1.41 
Day -1 0.404% 1.92 
Day 0 2.977% 7.99 
Day 1 0.596% 2.34 
Day 2 -0.798% -3.97 
Day 3 -0.276% -1.40 
Day 4 -0.163% -0.94 
Day 5 -0.381% -1.87 
Day 6 -0.097% -0.54 
Day 7 -0.379% -1.93 
Day 8 -0.455% -2.40 
Day 9 -0.385% -1.97 
Day 10 -0.018% -0.09 
                     
 Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (N= 611)        
 CAR t-statistic 
3-day event   (t-1 to t+1) 3.978% 7.97 
2-day event  (t to t+1) 3.573% 7.57 
5-day event (t-2 to t+2) 3.451% 6.44 
   
 Panel C: Cumulative abnormal Returns by Category 
      2 day event window 
 
 3 day event window  5 day event window  
 CAR t-statistic CAR  t-statistic CAR t-statistic 
 I. FDA Approval  
         (N=157) 
 
4.796% 
 
5.75 
 
4.970% 
 
5.49 
 
4.811% 
 
4.872 
II. Patent Grant  
         (N=123) 
 
2.727% 
 
3.06 
 
2.222% 
 
2.45 
 
2.281% 
 
2.308 
III. Scientific breakthrough 
         (N=147) 
 
5.554% 
 
4.37 
 
6.481% 
 
4.72 
 
5.718% 
 
3.841 
IV. Strategic Alliance 
         (N=112) 
 
1.879% 
 
1.84 
 
2.069% 
 
4.72 
 
1.355% 
 
1.87 
V. Others  
          (N=72) 
 
0.977% 
 
2.53 
 
2.671% 
 
2.11 
 
2.618% 
 
2.616 
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Table 3: Medium-Horizon Mean Abnormal Returns (in percent) Using Alternative Benchmarks 
 
Panel A documents the buy-and-hold abnormal returns several months before the announcements and after the announcements. Panel B documents the CARs. For all cases, 
the event month is the calendar month in which the announcement occurs. We use four different benchmarks to calculate the abnormal returns: size-and-industry matched 
firm, 4-Digit SIC industry portfolio, size and book-to-market matched portfolio, and Fama-French 3-factor model based portfolio.  Note that t-statistics are used to test the 
hypothesis that there is no medium horizon abnormal returns, and are cross-sectionally calculated. 
  Size-and-industry 
matched  firm 
    
 N= 580 
   Industry-Adjusted 
(4-Digit SIC) 
 
    N=580 
   Size and Book-to-
Market adjusted 
 
     N=580 
  Fama-French 3-factor 
based model adjusted 
 
                 N=580 
  
  Mean S.D. t-stat.  Mean S.D. t-stat.  Mean S.D. t-stat. Mean S.D. t-stat. 
                    Panel A: BHARs with respect to the firm's innovation news announcement 
5-month period before event 4.05 80.56 1.21 2.77 61.91 1.08 1.21 56.36 0.49 4.24 54.23 1.88 
2-month period before event 3.74 36.99 2.45 2.01 30.58 1.58 1.34 30.56 1.01 1.90 26.65 1.71 
1-month period before event 2.11 23.55 2.15 1.23 18.51 1.60 1.54 18.73 1.90 1.62 16.75 2.33 
Event month 4.99 22.56 5.33 1.42 18.26 1.87 0.77 17.24 1.04 1.48 20.02 1.78 
1-month period after event -2.03 22.11 -2.21 -1.93 16.37 -2.85 -2.43 16.62 -3.39 -1.89 15.70 -2.88 
2-month period after event -2.72 35.23 -1.86 -3.02 28.97 -2.51 -4.06 29.27 -3.21 -3.25 26.69 -2.99 
3-month period after event -2.73 34.27 -1.91 -4.05 33.72 -2.89 -5.83 35.08 -3.85 -4.17 31.16 -3.22 
4-month period after event -3.40 32.41 -2.52 -5.31 43.54 -2.94 -7.05 45.17 -3.62 -4.03 39.12 -2.48 
5-month period after event -4.19 61.14 -1.66 -7.30 48.60 -3.62 -9.29 48.98 -4.40 -5.30 42.37 -3.01 
6-month period after event -4.68 67.37 -1.67 -8.51 51.44 -3.98 -10.3 50.18 -4.75 -6.46 44.51 -3.49 
                Panel B: CARs with respect to the firm’s innovation news announcement 
5-month period before event 6.03 56.31 2.58 2.25 44.10 1.23 1.43 41.82 0.79 5.05 34.97 3.47 
2-month period before event 3.91 33.31 2.83 2.00 26.89 1.79 1.34 26.75 1.16 2.14 23.55 2.18 
1-month period before event 2.11 23.55 2.15 1.23 18.51 1.60 1.54 18.73 1.90 1.62 16.75 2.33 
Event month 4.99 23.56 5.33 1.42 18.26 1.87 0.77 17.24 1.04 1.48 20.02 1.78 
1-month period after event -2.03 22.11 -2.21 -1.93 16.37 -2.85 -2.43 18.62 -3.39 -1.89 15.70 -2.88 
2-month period after event -3.40 32.40 -2.53 -3.28 25.59 -3.09 -4.31 25.69 -3.89 -3.40 23.35 -3.50 
3-month period after event -4.38 38.41 -2.75 -4.19 29.98 -3.37 -6.03 30.95 -4.51 -4.06 28.07 -3.47 
4-month period after event -3.75 44.48 -2.03 -5.96 35.19 -4.08 -7.75 36.00 -4.99 -4.23 32.24 -3.15 
5-month period after event -5.74 49.66 -2.78 -7.93 39.67 -4.57 -9.47 40.06 -5.48 -5.11 34.67 -3.54 
6-month period after event -5.25 54.18 -2.33 -8.05 42.41 -4.57 -9.50 42.66 -5.16 -5.19 36.81 -3.39 
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Table 4 Test of Several Competing Hypotheses 
 
Panel A: Medium-horizon BHARs for IPO or SEO firms and Non-IPO and Non-SEO firms 
Panel A reports the post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by the returns of size and 
book-to-market ratio matched portfolios) for two different sub samples: 1. the firms that had had IPO or 
SEO within three years of the studied events (IPO or SEO firms); 2. the firms that had not had any IPO or 
SEO within three years (Non-IPO and Non-SEO firms). The abnormal returns are reported in percent. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 IPO or SEO firms  
(N= 128) 
 
Non-IPO and Non-SEO firms 
(N= 452) 
1-month BHARs after event -2.22   (-1.22) 
 
-2.47  (-3.16) 
2-month BHARs after event -3.29   (-2.51) 
 
-4.83  (-2.53) 
3-month BHARs after event -3.46   (-1.92) 
 
-8.43  (-4.22) 
6-month BHARs after event -6.78   (-2.04) 
 
-13.1  (-5.04) 
 
Panel B: Association between announcement period returns and medium-horizon returns before and 
after innovation news announcement. 
The panel reports the correlation between ER0, ER3, and BHAR-3, BHAR-1, BHAR1, BHAR3, BHAR4, 
where the medium-horizon abnormal returns are computed by using size and industry matched control firm 
approach.  P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 ER0 
 
ER3 BHAR-3 BHAR-1 BHAR1 BHAR3 BHAR4 
ER0 1.0000 
(0.00) 
 
0.8584 
(0.0001) 
-0.0559 
(0.1953) 
-0.0257 
(0.5515) 
-0.0220 
(0.6107) 
-0.0627 
(0.1465) 
-0.0435 
(0.3140) 
ER3  1.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.0116 
(0.7882) 
 
-0.0208 
(0.6305) 
-0.0179 
(0.6790) 
0.0092 
(0.8311) 
-0.0147 
(0.7339) 
BHAR-3   1.0000 
(0.00) 
0.4886 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.0988 
(0.0218) 
-0.0147 
(0.73390 
0.0119 
(0.7823) 
BHAR-1    1.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.0425 
(0.3249) 
 
0.0007 
(0.9868) 
-0.0392 
(0.3639) 
BHAR1     1.0000 
(0.00) 
0.5313 
(0.0001) 
 
0.4399 
(0.0001) 
BHAR3      1.0000 
(0.00) 
0.8582 
(0.0001) 
 
BHAR4       1.0000 
(0.00) 
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Table 5: Multivariate OLS regressions of announcement abnormal returns and medium-horizon buy-and-hold abnormal returns on various firm-specific 
characteristics 
For a sample of 611 innovation news announcements made by biotech companies during 1983-1993, we calculate the one-day and three-day announcement abnormal returns 
(ER0 and ER3 respectively). We also use the size-and-industry match firm approach to calculate the three-month and six-month post announcement buy and hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR3 and BHAR6 respectively). The independent variables are LME - log of market equity value; LBM - the log of book-to-market ratio; R&D/asset-1; 
R&D/equity-1; UNDERWRITTER - the relative standing of the firm’s lead underwriter (see Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998)); FIRMAGE - the log of firm age; IPOAGE - the 
log of the year since IPO;  SIZERANK, which measures which size quintile the firm is in  the universe of CRSP stocks, and BMRANK, which measures which book-to-
market quintile the firm is in the CRSP universe are also used as independent variables. t-statistics based on  heteroscedasticity-adjusted  standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, **, *** - significant at the 10%, 5% 1% level  
 
                                              
Variable 
 
 [1] ER0 [2] ER0 [3]ER3 [4]ER3  [5] BHAR3 [6] BHAR3 [7]BHAR6 [8]BHAR6 
Intercept  0.0392* 
(1.680) 
0.0217 
(1.093) 
0.0571** 
(2.020) 
0.0325 
(1.028) 
 0.0207 
(0.217) 
0.2158** 
(2.147) 
0.04174 
(0.659) 
0.2879* 
(1.964) 
R&D/asset-1  0.0199** 
(2.469) 
0.0169* 
(1.846) 
0.0400*** 
(3.262) 
0.0412*** 
(2.750) 
 0.0938** 
(2.237) 
0.0819** 
(2.046) 
0.1121* 
(1.954) 
0.1417** 
(2.479) 
LME   -0.0054* 
(-1.781) 
 -0.0059 
(-1.329) 
  -0.0141 
(-0.661) 
-0.0141 
(-0.498) 
 
LBM   -0.0039 
(-0.949) 
 0.0064 
(0.097) 
  0.0352** 
(2.116) 
0.0325* 
(1.920) 
 
SIZERANK  -0.0064* 
(-1.683) 
 -0.0092* 
(-1.842) 
  -0.0197 
(-0.959) 
  -0.0072 
(-0.326) 
BMRANK  -0.0061 
(-1.172) 
 -0.0037 
(-0.474) 
  0.03042* 
(1.980) 
  0.0329* 
(1.977) 
UNDERWRITTER  -0.0027*** 
(-2.846) 
-0.0025*** 
(-2.750) 
-0.0016 
(-0.979) 
-0.0053 
(-1.088) 
 -0.00002 
(-0.037) 
-0.0026 
(-0.488) 
0.0003 
(0.058) 
0.0003 
(0.055) 
FIRMAGE  0.0127 
(1.355) 
0.0151 
(1.440) 
    -0.0459 
(-0.925) 
 -0.0818 
(-1.146) 
IPOAGE    0.0049 
(0.542) 
0.0101 
(0.644) 
 -0.01101 
(-0.342) 
 -0.0438 
(-0.949) 
 
N  611 
 
611 611 611  580 
 
580 580 580 
Adjusted R2  0.036 
 
0.033 0.040 0.038  0.017 
 
0.021 0.020 0.021 
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Table 6: Financial Analysts Activities around Innovation News Announcements 
 
For the 580 firm-event observations, we search in the IBES summary database for the annual earnings 
forecast information. We first check whether the firm has annual earning forecast issued on the event 
month. Among the 580 observations, 347 of them have at least one annual earning forecast. For those 347 
observations, we calculate the earning forecast error, ex post. It is defined as the difference between the 
median annual earning forecast and the actual earnings realization deflated by the stock price at the end of 
the event month. t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Post-event BHARs (in percent, adjusted by the returns of the size-and-industry match) for the top 
30% and bottom 30% observations measured by ex post forecast error 
 
 BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3 BHAR6 
Top 30%  
(Optimistic group) 
 
-3.91 
(-3.38) 
 
-5.80 
(-4.28) 
-7.21 
(-3.61) 
-11.41 
(-4.53) 
Bottom 30% 
(Pessimistic group) 
 
-1.73 
(-2.11) 
-2.53 
(-1.99) 
 
-3.69 
(-0.97) 
-5.82 
(-2.82) 
 
 
 
